

STRATEGY
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A SOLUTION FOR SECURITY FORCE MANNING

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A Solution For Security Force Manning

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ABSTRACT

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After the end of the Cold War, the Air Force downsized. Many overseas bases closed. Consequently, the Air Force began to change from a forward based air force to an expeditionary one, projecting airpower globally from the continental United States. All career fields are reorganizing to support the expeditionary air force concept including the security forces. The Security Forces career field faces a unique challenge: meet higher operational deployment requirements and support base level force protection missions, with fewer personnel. The results of the higher operations tempo are reduced base customer service, readiness, and quality of life issues. Base level security forces squadrons experience higher operational risk and a decrease in airman retention. To solve this problem create additional security forces groups using the existing 820th Security Forces Group as a model. Transfer the 1,700 additional personnel authorizations earmarked by Headquarters USAF for Air Expeditionary Force support bases into three group organizations including the 820th Security Forces Group and 86th Force Protection Squadron. Security forces group personnel replace all deployed base level security forces squadron personnel who return to home base. Deployments for base level security forces personnel decrease, available manpower increases, and quality of life issues, readiness and customer service improve.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
PREFACE	vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
A SOLUTION FOR SECURITY FORCE MANNING	1
THE FUTURE: MATURE EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE CAPABILITY	1
THE COLD WAR	2
AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM	3
CREATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE	3
SECURITY FORCE MANNING SHORTFALLS	4
THE IMPACT ON SECURITY FORCES UNITS	5
REDUCTION IN BASE CUSTOMER SERVICES	6
WING AND UNIT READINESS	9
QUALITY OF LIFE	9
THE READY AUGMENTATION PROGRAM	10
A SECURITY FORCE MANNING SOLUTION	10
THE 820TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP	11
SECURITY FORCES GROUPS	13
LONG TERM IMPACT OF THE SECURITY FORCE GROUPS	13
CONCLUSION	14
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

PREFACE

Much of the information pertaining to the internal processes of a security forces squadron are a direct result of my last three assignments: an operations flight commander, and twice as a squadron commander.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. FUNCTIONAL CHART FOR SECURITY FORCES SQUADRON AT BASE LEVEL	6
FIGURE 2. BASE SERVICES REDUCTION MATRIX.....	7
FIGURE 3. INSTALLATION POSTING PRIORITY CHART.....	8
FIGURE 4. AEF CYCLE.....	12

A SOLUTION FOR SECURITY FORCE MANNING

Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF): The Air Force vision to organize, train, equip, deploy and sustain itself in the dynamic 21st Century global security environment. Under this concept, the Air Force will provide rapidly responsive, tailored-to-need aerospace force capability, prepared and ready to conduct military operations across the full spectrum of military operations.

—*Expeditionary Aerospace Force Commanders' Informing The Force Tools*

THE FUTURE: MATURE EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE CAPABILITY

Consider this possible scenario, in the year 2004 the fragile peace in the Balkans is shattered. President Milosevic decides that his continued survival rests on his ability to accomplish his original goal, the creation of a pure Serbian state. He renews a terror campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population. In a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations he attempts to drive out the 40,000 member UN peacekeeping force. His military tactics, both conventional and unconventional, include the use of mobile artillery, skirmish, hit and run tactics, anti-personnel mines, and devastating vehicle delivered explosive devices similar in power to the one that destroyed the American compound in Saudi Arabia in 1996. UN forces withdraw while Milosevic seizes the initiative and subsequently places loyal Serbians in the government in Kosovo to consolidate his hold over the country. In response, National Command authorities direct US participation in a NATO operation requiring the insertion of US/allied military air and ground forces to halt Serbian forces and set favorable conditions for the return of the peacekeeping force.

This operation could be more challenging due to several factors. Suppose, surrounding nations refuse to grant UN forces permission to stage from their territories. The UN mandate calls for forces to perform hostile entry operations directly into Kosovo. It would be necessary for Allied ground forces to search out and neutralize enemy capability and seize strongholds simultaneously reestablishing a UN presence. The U.S. Air Force responds by generating aircraft from five continental United States (CONUS) bases. Staging at Aviano Air Base, Italy these aircraft would re-form into the 31st Air Expeditionary Wing. As part of the response, members of the 821st Force Protection Squadron based in Sembach, Germany, prepared to deploy. Their mission would be, provide a self-contained force protection capability for the deploying expeditionary aerospace wing. Up to 100 members of the 821st would split into three flights and arrive in the joint area of responsibility prepared to immediately begin force protection operations.

This is a fictitious international operation but the requirements that it demonstrates are realistic. Our national military strategy relies on a rapid and responsive airpower capability. Today's Air Force must be global in reach and expeditionary in structure. Expeditionary air forces require combat support functions that are equally responsive, including force protection assets, such as security forces. The Air

Force Security Forces career field faces major challenges in supporting both home Air Force base and expeditionary air force, force protection missions. The current high operations tempo Air Force wide coupled with a chronic career field manpower shortage drives an increase in security forces personnel tempo. High personnel tempo affects unit readiness and quality of life with negative impacts in retention and recruiting. The purpose of this paper is to offer a solution, one that answers how to best optimize the use of finite security forces manpower. To understand the problem, this paper reviews the security forces support to Air Force operational deployments during three time periods, the Cold War period, the time period after Operation DESERT STORM, and the time period of Operation DESERT FOX including the creation of the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept. The relationship between increases in deployment operational tempo and the impact on security force units that support them is the current problem. I will propose a solution to this problem that will provide a Security Force able to support an air expeditionary force and home base simultaneously while decreasing personnel tempo and improving readiness and quality of life.

THE COLD WAR

In preparations for national defense we have to follow an entirely new course because the character of future wars is going to be entirely different from the character of past wars...We had better get accustomed to this idea and prepare ourselves for the new conflicts to come.

—Giulio Douhet

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force has responded to a request for air support by generating the needed aircraft primarily from forward located operating bases already near the theater in conflict or using these forward operating bases as intermediate staging bases to support deploying CONUS units. During the Cold War, secure bases in Europe or the Pacific were able to respond quickly to requests for airpower. Mature base infrastructures were able to provide complete support for deployed squadrons of aircraft and airmen, including force protection provided by the security forces squadrons. When units deployed, as part of their preparation, the deploying wing security forces squadrons would contact the deployment location security forces unit to insure that appropriate force protection was available for wing resources. If the receiving base lacked the surge capability to provide protection for additional aircraft, home base security forces would deploy with the wing. In cases where deployment locations had no in-place security forces manpower or force protection requirements exceeded in-place and home station deployment capabilities, the supporting major command reacted. It would allocate those additional taskings to other wings' Security Forces units or ask Headquarters USAF Security Forces for relief. The process was both transparent and predictable.

In the 1980's predictability was a function of the types and locations of assignments experienced by the typical career Security Forces airman. Duty included law enforcement, security operations and air base ground defense. Locations included both CONUS and overseas assignments, accompanied or unaccompanied in remote locations. Airmen would expect to go on remote assignments several times in

their careers, but the majority of their service time was spent performing duty on permanent Air Force installations. The number of deployments was small and normally based on service or DoD contingency operations and exercises. After the end of the Cold War the Air Force began to change.

AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM

500,000 military personnel participated in Operation Desert Storm. It was the last large scale buildup of American military forces and only possible due to the size of the Cold War American military. By 1994 the United States Air Force had downsized, from 600,000 to 444,000 active duty personnel.¹ However, the number of people deployed increased to four times the previous level.² The Security Force career field also downsized from over 50,000 during the height of the second Cold War to 20,000 by mid 1994. "The genesis of the AEF concept came in October 1994, when Iraqi forces under the control of dictator Saddam Hussein made new and threatening moves toward Kuwait. The US had long since removed the bulk of its Operation Desert Storm assets from the theater and was forced to make a hasty return to the Persian Gulf with enough forces to credibly deter a replay of Iraq's 1990 invasion. The return of forces proved to be a major challenge."³

The additional support requirements generated by operations like Desert Fox required a larger security forces presence. In response to increased taskings Headquarters USAF Security Forces increased the number of deployment allocations given to each major command. These requirements exceeded traditional taskings for individual personnel, and identified new taskings for 13 person teams and some requirements up to and including flight groups of 44 personnel that were required to deploy simultaneously. Major commands levied the new requirements down to the wing level units. The result: instead of a unit personnel deployment cycle of three to four years or once per assignment, each airman would now plan on an 18 month deployment cycle. Each deployment period would last from four to six months,⁴ resulting in additional impacts on home base Security Forces' ability to perform the force protection mission. Finding solutions to operations and personnel tempo became a top priority for Air Force senior leadership.

CREATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE

By 1997, Secretary of the Air Force, The Honorable Sheila Widnall, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fogleman decided that the essence of the new Air and Space Force's missions required a new vision, one that would move the service past Global Reach-Global Power. This new vision was based on the broad strategic guidance contained in the National Security Strategy, grounded in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept document titled, Joint Vision 2010.⁵ With air and space forces being the strategic instrument of choice in the 21st century, it became critical that the Air Force change to meet the requirements inherent in a strategy based on Global Reach. "The ability to hit an adversary's strategic centers of gravity directly as well as prevail at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. Global situational awareness, the ability to orchestrate military operations throughout a theater

of operations and the ability to bring intense firepower to bear over global distances within hours to days gives national leaders unprecedented leverage, and therefore advantages.⁶ This was the idea behind the creation of the Expeditionary Air Force concept. Transform the Air Force from one tied to overseas bases that no longer existed to a home-based military force able to project power over great distances giving the nation an on-call "911" capability as well as a coalition-building element envisioned in the Air Force's strategy of "Global Reach – Global Power." General Fogleman directed General Joseph W. Ralston, commander of Air Combat Command, to put together a concept for an air expeditionary force to demonstrate the ability to project long-range, lethal, sustainable, combat power inside of normal war plan time lines.

The initial concept called for three or four support aircraft wings to deploy a total of 34 to 40 aircraft. Of the supporting wings, one was designated a core wing. It contained "the skeletal framework—including headquarters staff—around which squadrons from other units would coalesce. Once in theater the AEF expanded to its full personnel strength around 1,100 or so and was designated a provisional wing.⁷ The EAF concept was developed with "shooter" airpower in mind. This meant that conceptually, success of the EAF was measured in the required numbers of air-to-air, precision air-ground, and defense-suppression or other airplanes quickly arriving into a specific theater, ready to begin generating sorties. Consequently, that priority drove EAF planners. Unfortunately the initial EAF concept put additional pressure on an already strained Air Force manpower system.

SECURITY FORCE MANNING SHORTFALLS

It's clear to me that many of you are deployed too often. Or you are overworked when at your home base because you're doing both your job and the jobs of those deployed. Our increased operations tempo – the result of reducing forces by 33 percent while increasing deployments fourfold – has put heavy strains on you and your family...

Air Force Secretary Peters, Oct 1998

According to the Air Force Chief of Staff, "EAF offers Air Force units, people, their families and ARC employers **greater stability and** Sustained **OPTEMPO has impacted** Air Force **readiness, morale, retention**, recruiting and modernization. The EAF construct provides the tools to **better manage the force**, determine its stresses, and when, where and how to focus contingency **operations tempo relief.**"⁸ Under the initial EAF concept the operational deployment process would become more visible, however, it placed additional stress into the support career fields. Operational requirements could be captured under the new EAF concept, however reduced force structure continued to strain to meet deployment taskings. Though aircraft were now deploying under a standardized rotation concept, Combat Support elements, specifically security forces units, continued to receive taskings for individual unit personnel and by Unit Type Code (Air Force Operational Plans) for EAF peacetime deployments. However, there was no corresponding reduction in the tasked unit's wartime deployment requirements.

Several additional factors exacerbated both the manpower shortages and the impact on the career field. Retention of first term airmen in the career field declined due to a variety of factors, such as the high operations tempo and a favorable civilian job market. While first term airmen were leaving the Air Force, the number of Air Force basic training graduates entering the Security Forces career field remained level. The result was career field manpower accessions falling short of career field manpower requirements. Additionally, the normal installation security force mission did not decrease proportional to the percentage of the unit personnel deployed compared to an operational aircraft squadron where home station responsibilities decrease as aircraft deploy.

Instead of decreasing, security force missions increased Air Force wide as a result of terrorist activity directed at U.S. military personnel in CONUS and overseas. The DoD directed that all services review and enhance their force protection programs after the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996. The Air Force subsequently directed all Air Force installations to increase their security postures by directing an increase in THREAT CONDITION (THREATCON). THREATCONs are used to describe progressive levels of terrorist threats to U.S. military facilities and personnel. The Air Force changed from THREATCON Normal (a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists) to THREATCON ALPHA (a general threat of possible activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which is unpredictable).⁹ The consequence was, the requirement for units to support enhanced force protection programs without receiving any additional manpower.

THE IMPACT ON SECURITY FORCES UNITS

The Air Force recognizes that new operational requirements generate additional deployment and force protection missions. These additional missions in-turn generate new personnel requirements that impact certain career fields more than others. The Air Force considers these career fields to be integral to the EAF deployment mission. Generally, they are less than fully manned, and as a result experience higher personnel tempos. Because these career fields are constrained by manpower availability that does not equal current operational requirements, the Air Force places these career fields in the category of "Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD)." ¹⁰ In order to meet greater operational requirements LD/HD career fields must develop alternative strategies for solving personnel shortfalls such as increasing the length of missions, shortening the length of time between deployments, and re-prioritizing and eliminating lower priority operational tasks. Security Forces are in this category.¹¹

More deployments and chronic personnel shortages have impacted security force units in three areas: customer services, readiness, and quality of life. Customer services are based on a unit's mission essential task list (METL). A METL is comprised of a unit's key processes. Once developed, key processes are the tools used to assess unit performance. Unit readiness is assessed in the following manner: the number of unit personnel available for duty placed against the number of personnel required to perform the unit's missions. Quality of life issues are those both tangible and intangible factors that contribute to the airman's personal satisfaction, such as living and working conditions, length of duty

hours, potential for career advancement, and the ability to pursue off-duty activities. Security Force units are impacted in all three areas, the most important being providing base customer services.

REDUCTION IN BASE CUSTOMER SERVICES

As the difference between operational manpower requirements and unit available manpower grows larger, security forces look for additional efficiencies in how customer services are provided. Security forces base customer services are derived from squadron METLs that are based on Air Force Security Force core missions. The squadron is organized into a four flight system. The Operations Flight accomplishes the following missions: Aerospace Systems Security (airplanes), Law Enforcement, Antiterrorism, Air Base Defense, and Corrections, Pass and Registration. The Administration and Reports Flight accomplishes Information, Industrial, and Personnel Security, and Reports and Analysis functions. The Training and Resources Flight is responsible for Combat Arms Training and Maintenance, Arms and Equipment, and Supply. The Standardization and Evaluation Flight performs all personnel qualification testing.¹² The sample functional chart for a base level security forces squadron at Figure 1 shows the relationship between the flights. The Air Force apportions manpower authorizations based on those missions, providing additional manpower to those units with 24 hour, continuously provided force protection missions. It is important to note that the continuous requirement for base level security force personnel to deploy was not part of the manning authorization equation, which results in shortfalls in available manpower for units tasked with frequent deployments.

SAMPLE FUNCTIONAL CHART FOR SECURITY FORCES SQUADRON AT BASE LEVEL – AFR 125-3




FIGURE 1. FUNCTIONAL CHART FOR SECURITY FORCES SQUADRON AT BASE LEVEL

One method used for identifying base services reductions is the development of a base services reduction matrix. The squadron command staff uses the matrix to capture all squadron key processes. Figure 2 shows a sample base matrix.

TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3
Base flag detail	Visitor reception Center hours of operation	Number of Base patrols
Base manpower Pool (bay orderly)	Community Service program Reductions (ie. DARE)	Longer duty Hours for Shift personnel
Wing special events	Minor traffic accidents	Wing training hours
	Opening locked vehicles	Use of command staff personnel

FIGURE 2. BASE SERVICES REDUCTION MATRIX

Reduction of police services is divided into three tiers. Tiers were determined based on impact of those service reductions to the base customer, an assessment of impact to Operational Risk and level of unit stress. Tier one reductions are generally non-core tasks traditionally provided by Security Forces. Tier two reductions are core Security Force missions. Reduction of these services impacts installation processes but generates additional manpower by reducing non- or lower priority force protection customer service functions in all flights (for example, responding to minor traffic accidents). Additional manpower is transferred to Operations flight, the nerve center of the squadron.

The Operations Flight is responsible for providing all personnel necessary to fill all patrols, and installation and internal entry control points. In order to minimize operational risk, the base services provided by the Operations Flight are only modified (for example, posts not manned) in case of contingency, exercise or emergency. Finally, in tier three reductions the installation assumes the greatest operational risk by reducing highest priority core force protection tasks and modifying Operations Flight processes (for example, deleting a base law enforcement patrol). Security forces squadrons have used all tiers to accomplish the mission.

The tiered matrix provides a comprehensive plan for security force and base leadership to use as a strategy for off-set incremental manpower shortages. The result of tier one reductions is manpower savings in the security forces squadron. Non-security force squadrons on the base assist by performing these targeted services or the services are eliminated. Under tier two, every security forces flight targets non-critical administrative functions for reduction. Administration and Reports Flight increases incident report processing and security clearance/finger printing times, while Training and Resources Flight eliminates certain base weapons qualification classes. These reductions lengthen base customer service

response times. Additionally each flight commander develops a prioritized flight personnel listing based on their service reductions. This list is used to provide additional personnel to augment Operations Flight. Operations Flight is responsible for maximizing internal flight processes by reducing internal administrative functions, and provides additional personnel to the shifts in Temporary Duty Available (TDA) for duty. These reductions do not directly affect installation force protection. These first and second tier measures do solve some personnel shortfalls.

In many cases, tier three measures become necessary for units to implement in order to accomplish installation missions. These base service reductions do directly affect force protection and the base population, for example when the base gate hours of operation, are reduced. For each time period a gate is closed, another Security Force airman is available to patrol the base and respond to incident or accidents, however operational risk increases for several reasons. First, traffic flow increases at other gates with a correspondingly greater risk for traffic accidents. Second, force protection concerns increase as heavier volumes of traffic at fewer gates increase the time that base personnel spend waiting to enter the installation, this wait creates a force protection vulnerability during periods of advanced THREATCONs.

When manning levels are still under the minimum number necessary to meet all mandatory force protection post requirements, Operations Flight develops alternative shift schedules. These schedules are designed to maximize the use of all personnel by increasing their duty hours. Shifts change from a standard eight hour duty schedule to a twelve hour duty schedule by implementing the following procedures. First, one of the three rotating swing and midnight shifts split into two elements, each element combining with one of the two remaining shifts to become a larger shift. There are now two large rotating swing and midnight shifts and day shift. Next, the on-duty, off-duty cycle changes from 6 days on

1. Flightline Alarm Response Team Ldr	11. THREATCON ALPHA asst Entry Controller
2. Flightline Alarm Response Team Ldr	12. THREATCON ALPHA asst Entry Controller
3. Flightline Security Response Team Ldr	13. THREATCON ALPHA Door Guard
4. Flightline Security Response Team Mbr	14. THREATCON ALPHA Desk Clerk
5. Installation Entry Controller	15. THREATCON ALPHA Visitor Reception Guard
6. Installation Entry Controller	16. THREATCON BRAVO Headquarters Guard
7. Desk Sergeant	17. THREATCON BRAVO asst Entry Controller
8. Flightline Alarm Response Team 2 Ldr	18. THREATCON CHARLIE Overwatch Sentry
9. Flightline Alarm Response Team 2 Mbr	19. THREATCON CHARLIE Overwatch Sentry
10. Shift Sergeant	20. THREATCON DELTA Overwatch Sentry

FIGURE 3. INSTALLATION POSTING PRIORITY CHART

and 3 days off, to 3 days on and 3 days off, or other schedules based on personnel availability. The twelve hour shift schedule creates increased operational risk in two areas: surge ability and safety. While in a twelve hour shift schedule, a squadron's ability to meet additional manpower requirements associated with advanced Threat Conditions or other contingencies is limited. When available manpower levels are still not sufficient, security forces use a "posting priority chart" similar to the one at Figure 3, to determine in descending order which posts will be manned first. Fewer personnel and twelve hour shift schedules equal less posted patrols. Using all available unit personnel to perform shift work, along with modifications to the shift schedule, created second and third order effects in readiness and quality of life.

WING AND UNIT READINESS

As the squadron reorganizes to meet Operations Flight manning requirements, unit readiness suffers because shift personnel are not available for mandatory training. Longer duty hours coupled with less off-duty time translates into insufficient training hours. Scheduled training is postponed or conducted during the guardmount inspection prior to posting out. Security force airmen are required to go through mandatory Air Force and career field specific training. Each airman must complete monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual training. Two alternatives are possible: certify additional trainers on each shift to teach recurring training before and after duty or use additional off-duty time to train. Both options are used to maximize on-duty training, thereby using the minimum amount of off-duty time. Additionally, the unit training program is reduced due to training staff personnel augmenting shifts. The security force training section operates all base weapons qualification courses. In addition to unit members receiving weapons training, all base personnel who are required to carry firearms receive weapons training from security forces trainers. Base customer service times increase as the number of training classes decrease. All of these actions not only result in decreased readiness, they also impact Quality of Life.

QUALITY OF LIFE

The Quality of Life of security forces personnel suffers as a result of manpower shortfalls. Workplace factors such as mission increases and longer duty hours drive down individual satisfaction. The Air Force Leave Program and professional military and off-duty civilian education programs are two programs that impact Quality of Life. While unit manpower is critical, unit leadership must strictly monitor the Air Force Leave Program, to ensure that mission accomplishment is balanced against the leave needs of the airmen. Only a minimum number of airmen can be on leave status at any time. For an average shift size of 23 to 25, only one or two personnel can be on leave. Failure to control numbers of personnel on leave translates into failing to maintain the minimum number of personnel required for mandatory posting requirements. Other Quality of Life issues surface such as restrictions on opportunities for Professional Military and off-duty civilian education. Morale factors such as non-rotating night work cycles and shorter times between deployment taskings add more stress. Even with all three tiers of services reduction measures in place, most security forces units need additional manpower relief in the form of augmentation from other units.

THE READY AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

Traditionally, Air Force personnel augmentation programs have been used to give career fields possessing contingency manning requirements the ability to surge through the use of personnel from other career fields. These augmentees are trained in lower priority contingency core tasks. One of these was the Air Force WARSKILL program. Airmen from other career fields and Security Forces Law Enforcement Specialists augmented Security Forces Weapons System Security Specialists, providing security for aircraft weapons systems. In the 1990's the WARSKILL program was replaced with the Air Force READY Program.

This program, like its predecessor identifies and validates additional unit personnel requirements by career field. A wing level board determines both personnel apportionments and allocations based on overall unit identified wartime, contingency and other requirements that exceed unit manpower.

Personnel from other squadrons are directed to the units with shortfalls as needed.¹³ This program has been used to off-set security force personnel shortfalls but was not designed to be a long term solution. However, in response to increased operational deployments since the end of the Cold War, wing READY Augmentees have been activated for months at a time in response to deployment requirements that depleted a significant portion of security forces personnel on multiple overlapping deployments. The wing READY Augmentee Program has become indispensable to mission accomplishment but is expensive in many ways. Base organizations that support the READY Program have lost airman from their duty sections for months at a time, impacting their assigned missions and increasing their operations tempo. There is a definite increase in operational risk associated with the use of READY Augmentees. These augmentees have less training and experience than regular security force airman. While READY augmentees have made the security force mission accomplishment possible, the extended use of these augmentees is not the long-term answer to security force manning shortfalls.

Security forces deployment and installation force protection requirements have increased at a time when manning shortfalls impact the entire Air Force. The Expeditionary Air Force concept offers a new vision for meeting the Air Force's global commitments. The current AEF deployment concept provides partial relief for combat support functions like Security Forces, through the development of Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS), support career fields that would be able to deploy with the same speed and agility as airpower.¹⁴ However, any permanent solution to security forces manning needs to also address base unit manning, to enable security forces to meet both future contingencies and the growth in home base force protection requirements.

A SECURITY FORCE MANNING SOLUTION

In the 1995 timeframe the Air Force Director of Security Police, Brigadier General Richard Coleman, published a white paper titled, Force Protection For the 21st Century.¹⁵ This paper described the future of force protection, detailing changes in the international security environment and their impact on the projection of airpower. In the new global environment mature forward operating locations, may not

exist. Instead the Air Force must be ready to project airpower on short notice and sustain operations for extended periods of time. This force must be self-contained and operate with a minimum logistics capability that includes spare parts, maintenance personnel, force protection assets, and crews.¹⁶ The force protection portion of that mission will require security forces that are light, lean, lethal, and agile. These "Defenders" must be capable of rapidly deploying ahead of the combat aircraft, arriving into theater with necessary equipment to secure an austere physical environment prior to the introduction of airpower assets. The Air Force has a group like this called the 820th Security Forces Group.

THE 820TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP

General Coleman had a solution that could enhance Security Force performance of the Force Protection mission. He envisioned squadrons of specially trained Security Force Defenders, specifically assigned the mission of a quick response ability to protect the Air Expeditionary Force. His vision set the course for the creation of the 820th Security Forces Group (820th SFG), stationed at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. The 820th was given the global "quick response" Force Protection mission for the Air Force. When the 820th SFG was created, the Air Force was reaching the end of downsizing and faced challenges in both recruiting and retention. The 820th manning buildup progressed at a reduced rate, with the result that they were unable to meet scheduled deployment requirements. Base security force squadrons filled taskings identified for the 820th.¹⁷

The additional personnel requirements for the new Security Force group were identified from within existing manpower authorizations within base level Security Force Squadrons. The 820th Security Force Group suffered from a lack of personnel and therefore was unable to support the myriad of Air Force taskings worldwide that required Force Protection. Base level Security Force units continued to deploy personnel in support of global air operations, while performing their home base Force Protection missions. Another partial answer to the Security Forces manpower shortage came in 1998.

In response to continued personnel shortages and the need for a "quick response" force, Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) proposed the creation of an expeditionary support structure of two squadrons similar to the 820th model designed to, "be a first-in unit tasked to conduct a security survey of an airfield. Security force personnel would work with the Air Mobility Squadron to prepare that airfield for arrival of expeditionary forces."¹⁸ The Draft Concept of Operations described this unit as, "A dedicated, highly skilled, multi-disciplinary, rapidly deployable team focused on delivering world-class force protection and airlift control expertise to USAFE AEF operations. Due to the time lag and airlift/surface limitations involved with an 820th deployment to the European AOR, the USAFE/CC envisions a USAFE-unique unit with an immediate response capability and minimal transportation requirements. The 86th Expeditionary Group will enhance our response times to Africa and other critical USAFE AOR locations."¹⁹

The 820th Security Forces Group and 86th Security Forces Squadron provide a partial answer to the present and future Force Protection challenges of the Air Force. However, they alone do not answer the specific long-term shortfall in Security Force personnel. The complete answer lies in consolidating requirements and building on General Coleman's original vision: units of Security Force Defenders, on-call for rapid response anywhere in the world supporting the AEF or any other contingency as directed. The current EAF concept calls for two Crisis Response Expeditionary Wings (AEW) and ten Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Two of the AEFs will be on-call or deployed. Two more AEFs will be in final deployment preparation, while the remaining six organizations will continue with normal training and exercises, preparing for their time on-call. All of this is based on a 15 month cycle, as Figure 5 depicts.²⁰




FIGURE 4. AEF CYCLE

Currently each of the ten Air Expeditionary Forces and five Mobility Lead Wings will have an organic Force Protection capability. This organic AEF Force Protection capability is additive to the normal base level Security Forces squadron's requirements. Headquarters Air Combat Command as the lead command for EAF execution has announced 5,820 Unit Manned Document (UMD) plus-up positions that will be apportioned to the AEF bases. These positions have been secured as a result of the Headquarters Air Force and Numbered Air Force drawdown/re-engineering process and through competitive sourcing and privatization processes. Seventeen hundred forty-two of the fifty-eight hundred twenty UMD positions will be apportioned to Security Force units assigned to designated AEF lead/support wings under Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) and the 820th SFG.²¹ My proposal will provide a permanent solution to the Security Force personnel shortage by expanding the security force group concept. Create additional groups using manpower allocated to AEF support squadrons.

SECURITY FORCES GROUPS

The Security Forces personnel shortage would be eliminated by using the already approved Air Force UMD plus-up positions to form three Security Force Groups designed to perform the same missions as the current 820th and 86th. Approximately 600 personnel would be assigned per group, further organized into three squadrons per group with a group headquarters element. The current 820th and 86th manpower authorizations could be used as group headquarters elements. This additional manpower pushes overall Security Force, AEF Force Protection support manpower authorizations up to approximately 2,000. The expanded 820th and the second group would be located in the CONUS, while the expanded 86th Security Forces Group would stay in the Europe. These groups would assume the AEF Force Protection support mission.

Three security forces groups can support the current 15 month AEF cycle and also any unexpected contingencies without impacting the base level security force missions. Each security force squadron (two within each group) rotates through an 18 month cycle. The squadron will spend 90 days deployed or on-call just like the two AEFs during that period. The next 180 days will be spent in normal training and exercises. After that, the next 90 days will be spent on-call for contingencies. The next 90 days will be training and exercise, followed by another 90 days of spin-up/deployment preparation. This new organizational structure will also simplify the deployment scheduling matrix prescribed in AFI 10-400. Currently the Air Force Expeditionary Control Center works through major commands, down to base level to task security forces. Under the security force group concept, two of the security forces groups are in a direct reporting chain of command to the HQ USAF/XOF. The 86th Force Protection Group would report directly to HQ USAFE/SF. As a result, all three groups will have a quicker response time.²² Security Force groups provide the answer to aerospace expeditionary force and the base level force protection missions. Base level security forces squadrons will still maintain readiness to support wartime deployment requirements for 2 major theater wars, however, the security forces groups take the deployment and contingency burden away allowing the base level squadrons to focus on the installation mission and simultaneously facilitate correcting the three career field problems: base customer services, readiness, and quality of life issues.

LONG TERM IMPACT OF THE SECURITY FORCE GROUPS

As the Security Forces groups begin to assume responsibility for AEF deployments and other contingencies, base personnel will re-deploy to home base. As they re-integrate back into their shifts, available manpower will rise. The READY Augmentee Program will be de-activated and shifts will transition to normal duty schedules. Base police services will increase as squadrons release administrative and training flight personnel to return to their normal duty locations.

Readiness would increase for several reasons: tour length, stability and shared expertise. Assignment to the Security Forces groups would be the same length as normal CONUS and overseas tours. A first order effect of the Security Force Groups would be highly trained Security Force airmen, ready to perform the AEF support mission. Airman in the Force Protection groups would be training,

preparing for deployment, deployed, re-deploying or on leave. These units would become more highly trained than the average base assigned Security Forces squadron. Due to the nature of the rapid response mission first term airman would be ineligible for assignment to these groups until awarded their 5 skill level. This qualifier would ensure that only more seasoned airman filled these organizations, with an added benefit of less training required before being prepared for the AEF support mission. A recruiting inducement such as hazardous duty pay while assigned to AEF Force protection duty or while on alert would reinforce the importance of the AEF mission.

This solution also provides a second order effects to the rest of the Security Force career field. Overall career field readiness increases after the first generation of Security Force group airmen rotate back to base level security force squadrons through the permanent change of station process. These airmen (officers, NCOs, and Airmen) will rotate back to installation Security Force squadrons and bring enhanced Force Protection attitudes and technical competencies with them. Operational risk will be reduced for several reasons. First, training time availability will rise and squadron personnel will better hone their critical wartime skills. Second, Quality of Life concerns such as off-duty time, AF Leave limitations, harsh duty hours and conditions, off-duty education, and Professional Military Education accessibility, will diminish. Working conditions will stabilize for several reasons. Unit personnel will not be deploying with same frequency that caused supervisors to change and performance reports to be constantly generated with the resulting turmoil and uncertainty. Third, with more personnel available for duty, more airmen are able to use their Air Force Leave. As shifts return to normal duty schedules, off-duty time increases along with opportunities of Professional Military Education and off-duty civilian education expanding back to normal. Stability and predictability will increase, which is the goal stated by the Secretary and Chief of Staff, of the Air Force.²³

CONCLUSION

Developing standing Security Forces groups is only one solution to the problem of how to balance limited manpower resources between installation Force Protection missions and AEF deployments and other contingencies. This solution continues the evolution in the Security Forces career field started by the creation of the 820th Security Forces Group and the 86th Force Protection Squadron.

The United States Air Force has changed since the end of the Cold War. Operations and personnel tempos have increased while the force has downsized. As a consequence, the Air Force has had to change the way it operates, evolving from a forward deployed service to an expeditionary air force capable of projecting airpower anywhere in the world. Increases in deployments have forced low density/high demand career fields like Security Forces to perform at near maximum effort for half a decade. The result has been an increase in operational risk, reductions in base services, a decline in readiness and Quality of Life. According to the Secretary of the Air Force, solutions must increase predictability, stability, and reduce the operations tempo. The creation of security forces groups, answer those concerns. The operations tempo is reduced because the groups take the AEF and contingency missions from the installation base level units. Home base units' manpower increases as deployed

personnel return. READY Augmentees return to their units as security forces shifts return to normal duty rotations. Stability and predictability increase since the security forces groups become normal PCS tours. Everyone in the Security Forces career field will serve in a security forces group as part of a normal career progression. With a group tour will come the expectation of deploying in support of an AEF or other contingency. Finally, combat readiness increases because both the installation security forces units and the security forces groups have more time to train for their respective force protection missions. The cross flow of technical expertise from the groups to the squadrons will continue to generate higher levels of competence and a resulting esprit de corps and morale. The final result is an increase in the level of base services provided by Security Forces. The Air Force Air Expeditionary Force and the Security Forces groups are the Air Force of the 21st Century.

WORD COUNT = 6389

ENDNOTES

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⁴ USAF Security Forces Unit Awards Program for Fiscal Year Ending 30 Sep 1998,(Active Duty Medium Security Forces Unit), 1.

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⁶ Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, 3.

⁷ The Air Force Association, "The Expeditionary Air Force Takes Shape."

⁸ EAF Fact Sheet, 1 Oct 99, Expeditionary Aerospace Force Commanders' "Informing The Force" Tools, [CD-ROM], 1999.

⁹ Department of the Air Force, Airman's Manual, Air Force Manual 10-100, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1 August 1999), 65.

¹⁰ Department of the Air Force, Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning, Air Force Instruction 10-400, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1 October 1999), 27. [CD-ROM], item 613826.

¹¹ Department of the Air Force, Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning, Air Force Instruction 10-400, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1 October 1999), 41. [CD-ROM], item 613826.

¹² Department of the Air Force, Security Police Standards and Procedures, Air Force Instruction 31-201 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 28 April 1999), 1, 2.

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¹⁵ Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman, U.S. Air Force, "White Paper: Force Protection For the 21st Century," 1995.

¹⁶ John A. Tirpak, "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," Air Force Magazine, 81, no. 12, available from <http://www.afa.org/magazine/1298airpower.html>; Internet; accessed 04 January 2000.

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¹⁸ HQ USAFE/SF, Questions from Organization Change Request, Department of the Air Force, Air Force Organization, Air Force Instruction 38-101, Chapter 5, 1 Jul 98 and Concept of Operations for USAFE Force Protection Squadron, 1998 (Draft), 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Lt Colonel Julie Stanley Julie.Stanley@carlisle.army.mil, "Colonel Bob Allardice, U.S. Air Force, Chief, EAF Implementation Division, HQ USAF/XOPE, EAF/AEF Implementation Update, CORONA TOP 99, briefing slides with scripted commentary," electronic mail message to Alan Anderson alan.anderson@carlisle.army.mil, 20 October, 1999.

²¹ Colonel Richard A. Dugan Richard.dugan@carlisle.army.mil, "Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) Questions Brief," electronic mail message to Lt Colonel Alan K. Anderson alan.Anderson@carlisle.army.mil, 08 November 1999.

²² Air Force Instruction 10-400, 13-15. The Air Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) is the CSAF designated coordinating authority and is authorized DIRLAUTH across all MAJCOMS, USAF components, and AEF/AEW scheduled units to provide readiness oversight and to integrate required planning and sourcing processes.

²³ Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten Peters, "EAF: A Journey, Not an End State, Policy Letter Digest, December 1999 and Air Force Policy Letter Digest October 1998, "Acting Secretary Speaks at AFA," available from <http://www.af.mil/lib/policy/letters/p198-10.html>; Internet; accessed 15 Nov 1999.

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